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Abstract
This paper provides a new benchmark for the analysis of the inter-
national diversication puzzle in a tractable new open economy macro-
economic model. Building on Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Heathcote
and Perri (2009), this model species an equilibrium model of perfect risk
sharing in incomplete markets, with endogenous portfolios and number of
varieties.
Equity home bias may not be a puzzle but a perfectly optimal alloca-
tion for hedging risk. In contrast to previous work, the model shows that:
(i) optimal international portfolio diversication is driven by home bias
in capital goods, independently of home bias in consumption, and by the
share of income accruing to labour. The model explains reasonably well
the recent patterns of portfolio allocations in developed economies; and
(ii) optimal portfolio shares are independent of market dynamics.
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1 Introduction
Home bias in investment is one of the main puzzles in international nance.
Investors tend to invest mostly in domestic assets, apparently without taking
advantage of the possibilities of international risk diversication. Lying on the
border between international macroeconomics and nance, the home bias in
portfolio selection has important implications for economic analysis and policy-
making.
Traditional theory, starting from Lucas(1982) seminal paper, tends to claim
that in a frictionless world with perfectly mobile factors, a portfolio should be
allocated based on perfect pooling. However, what is the benchmark for perfect
diversication? It may be that a small proportion of foreign equity is, indeed,
optimal.
This paper explores the demand for diversication due to investment uctu-
ations in a Cole and Obstfeld (1991) economy. Using the terms of trade (TOT)
mechanism to hedge risk works only when there is no possibility of intertemporal
transmission of consumption, i.e., of the mere existence of some investment that
destroys the power of TOT to o¤set productivity shocks. It provides insurance
only in a "static sense". If households account for future expectations they need
another strategy to ensure perfect risk sharing: some portfolio diversication.
I build upon Heathcote and Perri (2009, henceforth H&P) to analyze the
international equity puzzle in a tractable new open economy macroeconomics
(NOEM) model. Unlike H&P, I disentangle the technology of the consumption
goods from that of the capital goods and introduce dynamics to the markets.
My model is novel in a number of ways:
1. First, I di¤erentiate the Cobb-Douglas aggregator for the capital goods
used in the creation of the rms from that of the consumption goods.
This distinction is useful to ensure that one is not overlooking the role
of preferences in the model. Indeed, I show that the parameter tied to
investment demand produces the optimal bias in portfolio.1
2. Second, I explore the interrelation between investment allocation and rms
allocation, by adding the extensive margin in the markets.2 For this ex-
ploration, I assume that the introduction of a new variety requires an
initial sunk cost and some time to build up the plant before beginning
production. In the case of exible prices, the allocation of the rms, and
thus of the number of varieties supplied in the market, is independent of
the ownership of their shares. Consequently, the constant allocation of
investment is optimal even with market dynamics.3
1Apart from H&P, Coeurdacier (2009) also proposes a theoretical two-country model with
frictions in both the goods and nancial markets and nds a relationship between trade
openness in the goods market and home bias in portfolios. However, both papers place
consumption goods and physical capital goods in a single market.
2See Bergin and Corsetti (2005, 2008) and Bilbiie et al. (2005) for theoretical assessments
of the relevance of the extensive margin in di¤erent contexts.
3Although this experiment is beyond the scope of this paper, if one assumes nominal
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3. Finally, the role of the undiversiable labour income must not be dis-
missed. As in H&P, the technology parameter (i.e., the labour income
share) crucially a¤ects the degree of diversication, with a negative rela-
tionship. I focus on an incomplete-market framework4 where only shares
of rms and an international riskless bond are traded, and all goods are
tradable.
The optimal proportion of diversication predicted by this theoretical model
is compatible with the international portfolios observed across 24 developed
economies. Concerning the bias on capital goods, a large part of the literature
agrees that physical capital is mostly bought or built domestically. It is not dif-
cult to defend this claim: rst, construction (of the plants and some equipment
installation) is almost entirely local, and it represents a large proportion of the
total set-up costs; second, equipment trade is tied to costs arising from overseas
marketing, the negotiations for foreign purchases, transportation, tari¤s and
non-tari¤ barriers, the distribution in foreign markets, adaptations to foreign
conditions and standards, installation in foreign production facilities, the need
to train foreign workers to use the equipment and the provision of parts, main-
tenance and customer service from abroad. All of these features make capital
home bias even greater than that of consumption goods. I explore the empirical
evidence for 24 OECD countries in Section 5.5
The roadmap for the remainder of the paper is the following: Section 2
provides a brief literature review. Section 3 presents the setup of the model.
Section 4 gives us the equilibrium results. Section 5 develops the empirical
analysis. The conclusions are in Section 6. An appendix with the algebraic
details is available upon request. This is not necessary for the understanding of
the text and conclusions of the paper.
2 Literature Review
The rst question worth addressing is whether diversication increases the level
of consumer welfare. If it does not, the lack of diversication of the international
portfolio would not be such a puzzle but simply the result of agentsoptimal
decisions. Van Wincoop (1999) performed an accurate empirical estimation of
rigidities and a monetary policy that replicates the exible price equilibrium allocation, the
previous result holds independently of the price regime of the economy. I tried to introduce
nominal rigidities in prices, assuming rst producer currency pricing (PCP) and then local
currency pricing (LCP). In both cases, the optimal level of diversication coincides with that
of the exible price regime. However, when the authorities apply a general monetary policy,
the endogenous portfolio arising from the benchmark setup is no longer constant.
4 It provides perfect risk sharing, although it is not a complete market o¤ering a full set of
Arrow-Debreu securities.
5See Eaton and Kortum (2001) for an exhaustive empirical study on equipment trade.
Notice, however, that the analysis refers only to equipment and disregards construction. In the
model I present, one must consider "construction goods" to be aggregated in the composites
for consumption and capital. Thus, the correct proportion of capital produced domestically
must necessarily be higher than the levels indicated by Eaton and Kortum.
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the magnitude of these gains. He found that welfare gains increase with the
level of risk aversion and that they are equivalent to an increase in tradables
consumption in the range of 1.1-3.5% for a fty-year horizon and of 2.5-7.9% for
a hundred-year horizon.6 These are very large values. Thus, as Van Wincoop
argued, if the potential gains are so signicant, a crucial question is raised: why
have nancial markets not achieved greater risk sharing? One needs to better
understand both why investors do not assume diversied positions in existing
stock and bond markets and why markets that allow for trade in broad claims
on national income (macro markets) have not yet developed.
In Lucas(1982) seminal paper, households optimally split the portfolio half
and half to each country. They live in a one-good endowment economy. Bax-
ter and Jermann (1997) go a step further and introduce production with non-
diversiable labour. They conclude that the international equity puzzle is even
worse than Lucas claimed: households should go short in home assets to hedge
the extra risk generated by the undiversiable factor.
Economic research has moved in several directions to explain the home-
biased equities puzzle, which still remains an unexplained behaviour. Gehrig
(1993), Brennan and Cao (1997) and Martínez-García (2005), for instance, fo-
cus on the existence of informational asymmetries as the principal source of the
bias, whereas Jeske (2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) nd empirical
evidence against this theory. Another strand of literature, largely in line with
the latter, suggests focusing on the costs of diversication as relevant invest-
ment allocation barriers.7 It is also argued that investment may principally be
an issue of control rather than the scope of risk sharing. The concentration of
the ownership of savings among a relatively small number of individuals may be
evidence in favor of this explanation. It seems that the familiarity of investors
with a (local) rm, rather than the preferences regarding the aggregated domes-
tic portfolio, causes them to bias their savings towards home assets.8 The role
of non-tradable goods was a well-known direction of research by the nineties.
Tesar (1993) shows that the high correlation between savings and investment,
the low cross-country correlation between consumption growth rates and the
home bias in investment portfolios are consistent with complete nancial mar-
kets when agents face stochastic uctuations in the output of non-traded goods.
Consumer preferences regarding traded and non-traded goods and regarding
the intertemporal allocation of consumption may skew portfolios toward claims
on domestic output. In the same direction, Serrat (2001) tries to solve for the
optimal portfolios in an endowment general equilibrium model in which agents
consume a non-tradable good and a basket of home and foreign tradable goods.
Domestic investors own local nontraded assets and the home bias in tradable
6He argues that models assuming innite horizons are extremely sensitive to minor changes
in the estimated interest rate. For this reason, he considers di¤erent time horizons to measure
welfare gains.
7See Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001) for a view in favor of this explanation. They claim that
trading costs may be relevant if modeled correctly. See French and Poterba (1991) or Tesar
and Werner (1995) for arguments against it.
8See, for example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) for a discussion
on equity holdings concentration among a small number of better-o¤ individuals.
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equities is generated as in Tesar (1993). However, Kollmann (2006) revisits Ser-
rats model and shows that with a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator and
complete asset markets, the optimal portfolio remains indeterminate.9 Some
authors have even proposed that the home bias in data is due to a mere er-
ror of misspecication (Coeurdacier and Guibaud (2011)). Recently, Engel and
Matsumoto (2006) focused on nominal rigidities to generate a negative correla-
tion between labour and capital income, which drives the bias in favor of home
equities.
Cole and Obstfeld (1991) depart from the widespread view of most authors
that home bias is the result of market frictions or agentsunoptimal behaviour.
They present an extreme case where the lack of diversication is e¢ cient. The
hedge of risk operates via the terms of trade movements: any variation in the rel-
ative value of home output is compensated by a change in relative prices, keeping
the nominal intercountry di¤erence of consumption equal to zero. Hence, the
e¤ect of country-specic productivity shocks could be perfectly o¤set through
the international transmission. However, they limit the analysis to a labour-
economy setup, missing the potential role of investment.
H&P and a small collection of quite recent papers argue that the home bias
corresponds to the strategies of optimal rational agents for portfolio diversi-
cation. H&P go one step further and include capital in the model. Like Cole
and Obstfeld (1991), they rely on relative international price adjustment af-
ter shocks as the main mechanism to ensure the diversication of risk. Their
main nding is that a time-invariant share of investment on home and foreign
rms yields perfect risk sharing. Their model is built on Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland (1992, 1995), assuming that households only trade shares in domestic
and foreign rms. They allow for capital investment dynamics and imperfect
substitutability among traded goods.
Finally, the recent paper by Coeurdacier et al. (2007) addresses three main
stylised facts on international portfolios and exchange rate in an incomplete
markets scenario. The rst of these empirical facts is, precisely, the home eq-
uity puzzle. They argue that previous literature fails by accounting only for
supply shocks. Indeed, they are the rst to introduce two extra types of shocks:
redistributive shocks and relative demand shocks, which produce a home-biased
portfolio in equilibrium. They do so in a two-country, two-good world.
3 The Model
The world consists of two symmetric countries, denoted byH (home) and F (for-
eign) and an endogenously determined number of varieties, all of them perfectly
tradable. The home (foreign) country is inhabited by a continuum of homoge-
neous households with mass 1 that elastically supply their labour to domestic
9See, for example, Pesenti and Van Wincoop (1996, 2002) for empirical evidence against the
non-tradable goods explanation. A more recent paper on equity home bias and specialization
is Hnatkovska (2010). She uses a two-country two-sector model with tradables and non-
tradables.
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rms. There is no capital accumulation but only a cost of entry into the market.
Firms and agents are homogeneous within countries. However, preferences are
symmetrically biased towards domestically-produced goods. The monopolistic
rms set prices exibly by maximizing prots.
3.1 Households
Each country is populated by a continuum of households whose preferences are
dened over the consumption of nt + nt goods, which is a composite of home
plus foreign nal produced varieties. The preferences of home households are
represented by
Ut = Et
1
t=0
t [lnCt   `t (j)] ; (1)
where 0 <  < 1 is the discount factor and U (:) is a utility function dened over
the consumption of a basket Ct and a linear disutility of labour e¤ort represented
by parameter . Finally, `t (j) is the elastic labour supply of household j. The
consumption basket is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregator over the bundles of
tradables produced in the home (CH) and foreign (CF ) countries (i.e., a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) basket with unitary elasticity),
Ct = C

H;tC
1 
F;t ; (2)
where  < 1. CH andCF are CES aggregators over the n (n) varieties produced
in the home(foreign) country. For simplicity, I assume identical elasticities of
substitution, , in both countries:
CH;t =
Z nt
0
ct (h)
 1
 dh
 
 1
; (3)
CF;t =
 Z nt
0
ct (f)
 1
 df
! 
 1
: (4)
Here, h and f denote a specic variety of the corresponding country. Households
all over the world nance the creation of rms in both countries. To construct
her portfolio of investment, the home household purchases a fraction F;t+1 of
the shares issued by foreign-country rms and H;t+1 of the shares issued by
domestic rms, which will start producing in the next period. The household af-
fords her consumption expenditure and investment using the dividends received
from currently active rms at home and abroad, in proportion to her current
portfolio allocation: H;t, F;t, and her labour income. The budget constraint
is
Bt+1 + H;t+1
nt+1Z
qt (h) dh+ etF;t+1
nt+1Z
qt (f) df+ (5)
+
Z nt
pt (h) ct (h) dh+
Z nt
pt (f) ct (f) df =
= H;t
Z nt
t(h)dh+ etF;t
Z nt
t (f)df + wt`t (j) + (1 + it)Bt;
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where t(h) (t (f)) are the prots of a single home (foreign) rm in home
(foreign) currency; et is the nominal exchange rate (pt (h) = etpt (h)); ct (h)
the domestic demand for good h; nt is the number of rms allocated at home;
and wt is the wage. Bt is the international riskless bond. Finally,  indicates
the home bias on consumption preferences. An initial investment is needed for
a new rm to start producing. The cost to conduct this investment at home
(abroad) is qt (h) (qt (f)).
3.2 Firms
A continuum of n(n) tradable-good rms in the home (foreign) country act
in a monopolistically competitive economy. All of them sell their products in
both home and foreign markets. A sunk cost is paid at time t to develop a
new variety, which will enter the market at t + 1 and disappear at the end of
that period (full amortization). This cost is nanced by issuing equities in the
international stock market, i.e., both home and foreign agents have access to
shares of any rm created all over the world.
To produce a new home variety at time t + 1, entrepreneurs must incur a
startup cost of qt (h) = Pk;tKt at time t. Firms are fully depreciated after
one year of production. Kt is a composite good containing both home and
foreign varieties and following a Cobb-Douglas aggregator whose size of which
is randomly determined every period,
Kt = K

H;tK
(1 )
F;t ;
where KH;t and KF;t are the baskets of home and foreign nal goods used in
capital. The lower the Kt (Kt ) the more e¢ cient the home (foreign) country is
in the creation of new rms or varieties. Pk;t is the CPI for the basket Kt.10
Finally,  indicates the bias in the preferences of capital goods. Furthermore,
KH;t =
Z nt
h=0
kt (h)
1  1 dh
 
 1
; KF;t =
 Z nt
f=0
kt (f)
1  1 df
! 
 1
; (6)
with * on all the K and k for the foreign country. Hence, total investment at
home is
IH;t = nt+1qt (h) = nt+1PK;tKt:
10One may easily have di¤erent CES aggregators and/or an extra parameter of productivity
for K in the model (e.g., of the type Ki;t = AKi;t
R nt
h=0 kt (h)
% 1
% dh
 %
% 1
, where i = H;F
and % stands for the elasticity of substitution between capital goods, which may di¤er from
; the elasticity between consumption goods). However, the setup presented in this paper
disregards this alternative to concentrate only on the scope explained in the introduction. In
this case, the closed-economy version will have P = PK , as the unique di¤erentiation between
C and K is, by assumption, the Cobb-Douglas parameter ( 6= ).
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Once created, rms produce a di¤erentiated variety with a homogeneous
technology that requires only labour:
Yt(h) = AH;t`t(h)
: (7)
The state of the economy is then summarised by
fAH;t; AF;tg :
 is the share of output going to labour. (1  ) , which belongs to capital, is
distributed among investors via dividends.Yt(h) is the production of one rm,
and kt (h) is the demand for the nal good h by new entrants to build up their
plants. pt(h) is the price of variety h, which is exibly set by the monopolistic
rm, and `t (h) is labour demand for good h:
4 Equilibrium
4.1 The Households Problem
Households maximise utility subject to the budget constraint. The rst-order
conditions are the following:

wt
= t =
1
PtCt
(8)
or wt = PtCt; (9)
CH;t = 
PtCt
PH;t
, CF;t = (1  ) PtCt
PF;t
; (10)
ct (h) = CH;t

pt (h)
PH;t
 
, ct (f) = CF;t

pt (f)
PF;t
 
; (11)
1
PtCt
=  (1 + it)Et
1
Pt+1Ct+1
; (12)
qH;t = EtQt;t+1H;t+1; (13)
etq

F;t = EtQ

t;t+1et+1

F;t+1; (14)
where Qt;t+1 is the discount factor of future dividends and qH;t (qF;t) is the
country aggregate of qt (h) (qt (f)). Equation (8) is the endogenous supply
of hours of labour; (10) shows the allocation of the consumption expenditure
among home- and foreign-produced goods, which is constant due to the Cobb-
Douglas assumption; (13) and (14) provide us with the free entry conditions
for new rms. Firms will enter the market as long as the initial xed cost is
lower than or equal to the expected prots. H;t are the aggregate prots of all
domestic rms. Finally, (12) is the usual Euler equation, the intertemporal rate
of substitution between the consumption in periods t and t + 1. The welfare-
based price index is
Pt =
P H;tP
1 
F;t
 
; (15)
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where   =  (1  )1  . Also,
Qt;t+1 =
1
1 + it
= Et

PtCt
Pt+1Ct+1

= Et

t
t+1

is the intertemporal rate of substitution between the consumption in periods
t and t+ 1 . Foreign households solve an analogous problem with symmetric
preferences, i.e., they prefer the foreign-produced goods, f , as much as home
households prefer home-produced ones, h.
4.2 The Firms Problem
During the creation of the variety, home rms choose the demand of each capital
good, kt (h) and kt (f) , by solving the following minimization problems:
min
kt(h)
Z nt
0
pt(h)kt(h)dh  t
 Z nt
kt (h)
1  1 dh
 
 1
 KH;t
!
:
The rst-order condition is
kt (h) =

pt(h)
PH;t
 
KH;t (16)
and
min
kt(f)
Z nt
0
pt(f)kt(f)dh  t
0@ Z nt kt (f)1  1 df!

 1
 KF;t
1A ;
and thus,
kt (f) =

pt(f)
PF;t
 
KF;t;
where the shadow price, t = PH;t = n
1
1 
t pt (h) and 

t = PF;t . The optimal
baskets of home and foreign capital are
KH;t = 
Pk;tKt
PH;t
, KF;t = (1  ) Pk;tKt
PF;t
:
Firm h today has a demand for variety h, to be used in building rms, of
nt+1kt (h) .  > 1 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution among goods,
and the price indexes for capital are,
PK;t =
(PH;t)

(PF;t)
1 
 
, P K;t =
 
P H;t
1   
P F;t

 
;
where   = 
 (1  )1  .11
11The condition for stability requires that 1 >   1

.
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Moreover, rms choose the amount of labour that minimises costs,
minwt`t (h) ;
subject to the technology constraint. Thus, the rst order condition is
t =
wt
AH;t
`t (h)
1 
= mg cost,
where t is the Lagrange multiplier. Once operative, rms maximise prots:
max
pt(h)
pt(h)Yt(h)  wt`t (h) ; (17)
subject to the technology restriction and demand. Thus, the optimal price is
pt(h) =

   1
1

wt
A
1

H;t
Yt(h)
1
 1:
Prices consist of a constant mark-up over the expression of marginal costs which
depends crucially on the level of production, due to the non-linear technology.
4.3 Market Clearing
The clearing conditions for the domestic and foreign goods markets are the
following:
ct (h) + c

t (h) + nt+1kt (h) + n

t+1k

t (h) = Yt (h) ; (18)
ct (f) + c

t (f) + nt+1kt (f) + n

t+1k

t (f) = Yt (f) : (19)
A rm satises four sources of demand: those of the home and foreign households
and those of the rms that will produce next year in the home and foreign
countries.
The labour market is emptied when
nt`t (h) = `t (j) ; (20)
nt `

t (f) = `

t (j
) : (21)
Finally, the nancial markets in equilibrium must fulll
Bt =  Bt ; (22)
H;t = 1  H;t; (23)
F;t = 1  F;t: (24)
Under this non-linear technology, one can write home aggregate prots as a con-
stant fraction of total revenue, although this fraction is di¤erent from that found
under constant returns to scale (with linear technology CRSH =
1
PHYH < 
DRS
H ).
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This fraction depends on both the elasticity of substitution and the technological
parameter. Hence,
H;t = PH;tYH;t

1     1



=

 (1  ) + 


PH;tYH;t: (25)
Notice that (1 )+   1 > 0 . The amount of prots over total income is higher
due to the diminishing returns to scale in the technology. One can also write
the labour cost as a fraction of the output of the rms:
wt`t (h) =
   1

pt (h)Yt (h) : (26)
4.4 The labour Demand
The f.o.c. for home rms was
`t (h) =

wt
AH;t
1

1
t
 1
 1
:
I use the technology restriction to get the Lagrangian multiplier t = pt (h)
 1

so that
`t (h) =

   1

AH;t
wt
pt (h)
 1
1 
:
Households supply an elastic amount of labour. It increases with the increment
of the returns to scale of their e¤ort, i.e. the higher  is, the more productive
labour is, and the higher the willingness to work. labour supply goes up for
higher levels of AH;t, the productivity of technology, and for higher prices,
because, in this case, they need more income to be able to consume the same
amount of goods. Finally, given prices, they supply less labour when wages are
high.
4.5 Optimal Diversication Level 
Let us conjecture that an equilibrium allocation exists with B = 0 and constant
portfolio demand H;t = F;t =  for symmetric countries (Lt = L

t = 1) such
that
PtCt = etP

t C

t ; (27)
i.e., where households achieve perfect risk sharing. So that Qt = etQt , sto-
chastic discount rates are the same across countries. Hereafter, it is shown that
this allocation is indeed an equilibrium allocation by characterizing the associ-
ated vector of equilibrium prices and verifying that prices and quantities satisfy
householdsrst-order conditions, market clearing conditions and the resource
constraints.
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Let us dene the following relative variables in nominal terms:
4C = PtCt   etP t Ct ; (28)
4| = nt+1Pk;tKt   etnt+1P k;tKt = IH;t   etIF;t;
4U = PH;tYH;t   etP F;tYF;t:
These equations are the intercountry di¤erences in consumption, investment and
output in nominal terms. Moreover, from the goods market clearing conditions,
Home Output
PH;tYH;t = PH;t
PtCt
PH;t
+ etP

H;t (1  )
P t C

t
P H;t
+ nt+1PH;t
Pk;tKt
PH;t
+
+nt+1etP

H;t (1  )
P k;tK

t
P H;t
:
Foreign Output
P F;tYF;t = P

t C

t +
PtCt
et
(1  ) + nt+1PH;t
et
(1  ) Pk;tKt
PH;t
+
+nt+1P

H;t
P k;tK

t
P H;t
:
By taking the di¤erences, I have an expression for the output absorption in the
economy, i.e., the allocation of output into di¤erent uses.12
4Y = (2   1)4C+ (2   1)4|: (29)
The di¤erence in nominal output is due to the di¤erences in consumption and
investment. The size of each of them in 4U depends on the corresponding
parameter of the Cobb-Douglas aggregator in C or K,  or . Hence, in the
conjectured equilibrium,
4Yj4C=0 = (2   1)4|: (30)
Let us take the home and foreign householdsaggregate budget constraints,
PtCt = wt`tLt + (1  )ntt (h) + etntt (f)  (1  ) IH;t   etIF;t;
P t C

t = w

t `

tL

t +
1
et
H;t + (1  )F;t  
1
et
IH;t   (1  ) IF;t
and substitute the expressions for prots and labour income as a function of
GDP (eq. 25 and 26).
PtCt =
   1

PH;tYH;t + (1  )

1     1



PH;tYH;t +
et

1     1



P F;tYF;t   (1  ) IH;t   etIF;t
+(1 + it)Bt  Bt+1
12This equation is the equivalent of number 31 in H&P.
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and
P t C

t =
   1

P F;tYF;t + 
1
et

1     1



PH;tYH;t +
+(1  )

1     1



P F;tYF;t   
1
et
IH;t   (1  ) IF;t
+(1 + it )B

t  Bt+1;
where PH;tYH;t is the nominal domestic output (Y); P F;tYF;t is the foreign
output (Y); and I is the investment of the current period. By imposing
PtCt   etP t Ct = 0 ,
C = Y

   1

 + (1  2)

1     1



 | (1  2)
+ ((1 + it)Bt  Bt+1)  et
 
(1 + it )B

t  Bt+1

:
Plugging in equation (30) and setting the gross and net holding of bonds iden-
tically equal to zero, B = 0 ,13 I obtain
C =

1 + 2

   1

   1

(2   1)4| | (1  2) : (31)
4.6 Terms of Trade
Terms of trade are dened as the price of a countrys exports in terms of their
imports, i.e., TOT =
PH;t
PF;t
. One can derive TOT from the resource constraints.
In the case of symmetric countries, which I have assumed Lt = Lt = 1 ,
CH;t + C

H;t + nt+1KH;t + n

t+1K

H;t = YH;t;
CF;t + C

F;t + nt+1KF;t + n

t+1K

F;t = YF;t:
Taking the ratio of the two equations on PtCtPF;t and
Pt C

t
PH;t
yields an expression
for the terms of trade,14
TOTH;t =
1
et
YF;t   nt+1KF;t   nt+1KF;t
YH;t   nt+1KH;t   nt+1KH;t
:
13This equation is the equivalent of 32 in H&P.
14 If I allow for Lt 6= Lt ,
LtCH;t + L

tC

H;t + nt+1KH;t + n

t+1K

H;t = YH;t;
LtCF;t + L

tC

F;t + nt+1KF;t + n

t+1K

F;t = YF;t:
Then,
TOTH;t =
1
et
[Lt + (1  )Lt ]
h
YF;t   nt+1KF;t   nt+1KF;t
i
[(1  )Lt + Lt ]
h
YH;t   nt+1KH;t   nt+1KH;t
i :
13
The terms of trade depend on the relative supply of the output net of investment.
Given investment, the international transmission is positive: an increase in net
home output benets foreign households by lowering the home output prices.
At the same time, a positive productivity shock at home raises investment.
Let   =  (1  )1  . Hence, the price indexes can be rewritten as
Pt =
PH;t
 
 
YH;t   nt+1KH;t   nt+1KH;t
YF;t   nt+1KF;t   nt+1KF;t
!1 
; (32)
P t =
PH;t
et 
 
YH;t   nt+1KH;t   nt+1KH;t
YF;t   nt+1KF;t   nt+1KF;t
!
: (33)
For  = 1=2 , householdspreferences are identical, and the real exchange rate
P=P  equals 1. In other words, purchasing power parity holds.15 For  6= 1=2 ,
instead, home bias in consumption implies that the real exchange rate (RER)
is not constant, but changes with the terms of trade:
RERt =
Pt
etP t
=

PF;t
PH;t
1 2
: (34)
With perfect risk sharing, it follows that the ratio between consumption levels
is also equal to RER.
Ct
Ct
=

PF;t
PH;t
1 2
: (35)
4.7 Transmission Mechanism
Equation (31), which I restate below, is the key equation yielding explanations
for investorsbehaviour:
C =
via prices
via Yz }| {
(2   1)
z }| {
1  2

1     1



| {z }
indirect e¤ect
4|  (1  2)|| {z }
direct e¤ect
:
To make the mechanism clear, let us assume that a fully anticipated shock
consistent with a rise in relative investment occurs (i.e., IH;t+1 whereas IF;t+1
remains constant).16 First, consider an environment where the basket of capital
goods is biased towards domestic varieties ( > 12 ). Thus,  <
1
2 .
In brief, one can state that the IH;t+1 causes a quantity and a valuation
e¤ect, and these disturb perfect risk sharing. The shock generates an increment
in home householdswealth whereas foreign wealth decreases. This di¤erence is
reected in the valuation of home output via the increase in prices.
15This is the case in Cole and Obstfeld (1991).
16A typical example of IH is the expectation of a future increase in home productivity, so
that agents want to create more rms to take advantage of such improvement.
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I can split the overall impact into two simultaneous e¤ects that move in op-
posite directions. On the one hand, | has a negative direct e¤ect on C. The
relative demand for home goods increases because they are used to satisfy the
extra investment. Although part of this cost is nanced by foreigners through
ownership ( 12 >  > 0 ), the home household is forced to reduce her relative
consumption. This impact on C helps to regulate the nancial ows and thus
avoids disturbing perfect risk sharing.
Notice that when  = 0 (no diversication), the term (  (1  2) ) equals
 1. Thus, an increment of one euro in domestic investment directly implies
a one euro reduction in domestic consumption because it generates a one-unit
decline in dividends received by home households. By contrast, if  = 1 (home
households own only foreign assets), the direct term equals 1. Thus, an extra
euro of home investment generates a reduction of one euro in foreign consump-
tion because the foreign households nance the whole cost of this investment.
In contrast, the indirect e¤ect, the impact of Y on C, is positive. This
e¤ect can also be separated into two parts. The rst, (2   1) , captures the
extent to which an increase in domestic absorption (in this case, investment)
increases the relative value of home output. The second, (1  2  1   1  ),
reects the impact of a change in relative output on relative consumption. It
shows that an increment in relative demand for home goods has a positive e¤ect
on the terms of trade for the domestic economy. This e¤ect is negatively related
to  and positively to  because the larger the non-diversiable labours share,
the larger the impact of an improvement in the domestic economys terms of
trade on relative consumption, given .17 Similarly, the smaller the diversica-
tion level , the larger the impact of a variation in relative prices on C.
To sum up, when the shock is anticipated, home output has a higher relative
value due to the increment of the demand. In consequence, the distributed
dividend, which belongs partly to foreign households, is larger. The increase in
the output demand pushes the quantity of labour up, and therefore the total
labour income increases, causing households to become richer.
Indeed, the magnitude of this general equilibrium e¤ect is greater than the
magnitude of the direct e¤ect when  (the proportion of foreign assets) is inef-
ciently high and vice versa.
To compensate for a situation like this and re-establish perfect risk sharing,
 must increase. Therefore, a larger proportion of dividends is redistributed to
the foreign households to produce a smooth consumption. In this way, home
households pass part of their wealth to the other country and simultaneously
reduce the demand e¤ect. The latter occurs because, although they are import-
ing more, these imports are partly nanced by giving extra ownership to the
foreigners.
In the case in which capital goods are mostly composed of foreign varieties
( < 12 )  > 12 ), all the e¤ects act in the opposite direction. The direct e¤ect is
positive, while the indirect e¤ect becomes negative. This change is reasonable
17This feature is because most of the revenue goes directly to labor, via wages. Real wages
are a¤ected by changes in relative prices. In contrast, when a large part of the households
income comes from dividends, TOT loses its capacity to o¤set the impact of the shocks.
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because the demand generated by the extra investment must now be mostly
covered by foreign goods, and therefore foreign output increases in value with
respect to home production.
This result yields a basic conclusion: diversication is not a tool to redis-
tribute purchasing power, but to control the excess of demand.18 And it is the
existence of investment that makes diversication necessary, because terms of
trade are not able to neutralise the consequences of the shocks.
By setting C = 0 I solve for ,
 =
1  
1 + (2   1)   1    1 : (36)
Equation (36) is the equilibrium value for , i.e., the diversication level for
which the direct and indirect e¤ects of a shock disturbing relative consumption
(for instance, a shock in investment) are exactly o¤set.
Households allocate a positive part of their portfolios to foreign assets,
0    1 . Notice that it is not the parameter from the preferences on con-
sumption () that plays a role in the diversication, but the parameter of the
preferences on capital goods (). Hence, it is important to disentangle these two,
allowing them to be di¤erent. The larger the home bias in the preferences for
capital goods, the less they diversify. The value of  decreases with  and is kept
above 12 for  <
1
2 and below
1
2 for  >
1
2 . Thus, like H&P, I nd a portfolio
biased towards home assets to be the optimal allocation for households to reach
perfect risk sharing. A larger trade share (smaller ) in capital goods implies a
weaker terms-of-trade response to changes in relative nal demand. Thus, for
any given diversication level, the indirect e¤ect of demand changes on rela-
tive consumption that works through prices is going to be smaller. Moreover,
whilst   12 ,  decreases with the labour income share because when  is high,
terms of trade does most of the work in equalizing consumptions. A smaller
diversication is needed to produce perfect risk sharing.
In the extreme case of  ! 1 , i.e., the country uses only domestically pro-
duced goods as capital in the creation of new rms, households do not diversify
at all, ! 0 . This result shows, again, that the home bias in consumption
preferences is not relevant for diversication, but it also shows that the size of
the labour income share alone, without the presence of some bias in demand
(here in capital goods), is not important either. The reason is easy to under-
stand: when home agents use only their own goods to create rms, the rst
term of the indirect e¤ect, the one explaining the impact of relative output on
relative consumption, is zero. There is no valuation of home output because
exible prices react one-to-one to the excess of demand, compensating for the
shock and ensuring perfect risk sharing. Thus, this result agrees with Cole and
Obstfelds result. Finally, when the bundle of capital goods is equally divided
18Notice that  and  appear multiplied by 2. When investment at home goes up, the home
country increases the demand both for domestic goods (by ) and for foreign goods (by 1  )
and etP F;tK

F;t = (1  )PK;tKt,PH;tKH;t = PK;tKt. Thus, | includes the term (2   1).
By the same token, PtCt   etP t Ct = :::  (1  )PK;tKt   ( )PK;tKt = (2  1)PK;tKt.
16
between home and foreign varieties, households need perfect pooling (i.e., they
divide their portfolios perfectly between home and foreign equities) to achieve
perfect risk sharing, as in H&P paper.
In H&P, the share of diversication of the portfolio ish
1  HP
i
=

1  !
1 + HP   2!HP

!= 12
=
1
2
;
where HP is the capital income share; ! is the parameter of the Cobb-Douglas
aggregator in consumption (i.e., the indicator of the bias in consumption); and
1  HP is the level of diversication in the portfolio (i.e., the equivalent of 
in this paper.)
The reason is that when the demand on capital goods is equally allocated be-
tween home and foreign goods, any increase in either home or foreign investment
pushes the demand for domestic and foreign varieties in the same proportion,
keeping the terms of trade invariable (the indirect e¤ect is zero). Thus, if agents
rely on perfect pooling, they share the weight of the nancing whichever country
is a¤ected by the shock.
The model provides an example of complementarity between terms-of-trade
movements and income transfers via asset holdings in insuring against consump-
tion risk from productivity uctuations.
Relative price movements already provide some consumption risk insurance,
but it is not perfect because trade ows among countries move terms of trade
in response, not only to consumption but also to investment needs. These
needs are possibly driven by expectations of future returns to capital. Portfolio
diversication provides a way to insulate terms of trade from the components of
demand due to investment. Hence, income ows from assets cover the demand
for local inputs by foreign rms: the higher the proportion of investment that
is local, the lower the need to diversify.
4.8 Allocation of Firms
Firms are allocated in the home or the foreign country based on the free entry
conditions (FECs). These conditions provide us with a system of two di¤erence
equations to solve for n and n. At Home, the FEC is
PK;tKt = PH;tKH;t + PF;tKF;t = EtQt;t+1t+1 (h) :
After some algebra, one nds a system of two non-linear di¤erentiated equations
on n and n,
nt+1
24KH;tYt(h) 1 1
A
1

H;t

1  

1     1



+KF;t
Yt(f)
1
 1
etA
1

F;t
35 = 1     1




   1

Et
2664 Lt+1 + Lt+1 (1  )
h
AF;t+1
AH;t+1
i 1

h
Yt+1(h)
Yt+1(f)
i 1
 1 nt+1
nt+1
+
+ 1

 1
Yt+1(h)
1

 1
A
1

H;t+1
nt+2K

H;t+1
3775
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and, symmetrically,
nt+1
24KF;tYt(f) 1 1
A
1

F;t

1  

1     1



+KH;t
Yt(h)
1
 1
A
1

H;t
et
35 = 1     1




   1

Et
264 Lt+1 + Lt+1 (1  )
h
AH;t+1
AF;t+1
i 1

h
Yt+1(f)
Yt+1(h)
i 1
 1 nt+1
nt+1
+
+ 1

 1
Yt+1(f)
1

 1
A
1

F;t+1
nt+2KF;t+1
375
Although an analytical solution for n and n cannot be provided, it is worth
noticing that the expressions above do not depend on  at all. Hence, the deci-
sion on the allocation of plants of production is completely disconnected from
the decision on the ownership of rms made by agents in the home and foreign
countries. Therefore, it follows that the dynamics of markets do not invalidate
the main result, i.e., constant biased , found in a perfectly competitive world.
5 Empirical Analysis
Equation (36) provides a prediction of the share of foreign assets in aggregate
portfolios and links the imports share of physical capital (1  ) with interna-
tional diversication. In this section, I compare these predictions with the data
to assess the extent to which the model can explain the behaviour of interna-
tional diversication in developed countries during recent decades.
My model, similar to H&Ps, focuses on a two-symmetric-country model,
whereas di¤erent international portfolios belong to highly heterogeneous coun-
tries.19 For the moment, I address this caveat by limiting the empirical analysis
to 24 relatively homogeneous countries with open nancial markets: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ire-
land, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United
States. These countries are high income economies under World Bank classi-
cation.
As is discussed in the following subsections, I use exactly the same measure
and databases for aggregate portfolio diversication and for national wealth
that are used by H&P. My data di¤ers from their data only in two ways: (i)
due to my theoretical model, I consider the level of international openness in
the capital goods market instead of the level of openness in total trade; and (ii)
I use actual values of labour income share instead of a standard accepted value.
H&P enrich their empirical study by assessing whether factors omitted in
the model, such as size or level of development, are important empirical factors
in explaining diversication patterns. They conclude that the control variables
19H&P, for example, experimented with countries with di¤erent levels of population and
found that the structure of their portfolios barely diverged from the prediction in the two-
symmetric-country model.
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are not statistically related to diversication, as long as their openness variable
(which drives the main result) is retained.20 I take these results to be fair and
limit my analysis to the relationship between openness in the capital goods
market and in the nancial markets.
5.1 Trade in Capital
Based on the theoretical interpretation of the transmission mechanism, I need
the presence of home bias in physical capital to lead the biased aggregate port-
folios. Capital in the model is built period by period to create new varieties and
it is not accumulated. The parameter  that appears in equation (36) belongs
to the technology of creation of this capital. Hence, the most suitable measure
of (1  ) in the data should be the share of imports in gross xed capital
formation. The trade share in capital goods is dened as
(1  )it =
Mk;it
GFCFit
;
where Mk;it is the cost of imports in capital goods of country i in period t, and
GFCFit is the gross xed capital formation. Both the imports content of GFCF
and GFCF itself come from the OECD database.
Since 1995, OECD has collected data on the imports content of gross xed
capital formation every ve years. The series is not available for all OECD
countries but only for 24 of them. All these countries show a share of imports
below fty percent in their capital formation.21 Table 1 provides some examples
of these shares.
(1  )
Country 1995 2000 2005
Australia 0.13 0.14 0.12
France 0.12 0.13 0.11
Ireland 0.43 0.25 0.17
Japan 0.03 0.05 0.06
United States 0.10 0.08 0.08
Table 1: M over GFCF. Source: OECD, own calculations.
20H&P repeat the regressions for a larger group of countries that includes developing
economies and nd that, although the strong link between trade and diversication remains,
income per capita becomes an important determinant of diversication, with richer countries
being more diversied. Hence, it is necessary to restrict the data to relatively homogeneous
countries due to the structure of the model.
21 Ireland shows the highest level of imports over gross xed capital formation in 1995, at
43%, although the share decreases to 17% in 2005. The lowest level is for Japan, which does
not exceed 6%.
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5.2 Diversication
The reciprocal of equation (36) provides us with a linear relationship between
the reciprocal of diversication, 1 , and the reciprocal of the trade share of
capital goods, 11  :
1

= 2 (1 ) +  1
1   ; (37)
where  =  1 relates the reciprocal of international diversication with the
elasticity of substitution. There are two aims of this section: to determinate
whether the predicted link in equation (37) is present in the data and to observe
the explanatory power of the theoretical model.
The level of international diversication in the general equilibrium macro-
economic model derived here, , is a broad measure of diversication. In the
data, I must choose an aggregated measure of both the ratio of gross foreign
assets and the ratio of gross foreign liabilities to country wealth. I use the Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006)22 dataset to obtain total foreign assets and liabilities.
These measures include portfolio equity investment, foreign direct investment,
debt (including loans or trade credit), nancial derivatives and reserve assets
(excluding gold). Total country wealth is dened as the value of the entire
domestic capital stock plus gross foreign assets, less gross foreign liabilities:
W = K + FA  FL . H&P develop an accurate discussion of the method to
construct the most suitable measure of capital. I rely on their series, which bor-
row the initial value for capital stock from Dhareshwar and Nehru (1993) and
build time series by accumulating net investment from the Penn World Tables
6.2.23 Hence, international diversication for country i in period t is
it =
FAit + FLit
2 (Kit + FAit   FLit) :
Theoretical macroeconomic literature tends to assume a labour income share
around 0:66. Because diversication in my model depends crucially on this
share, I preferred to use the actual values provided by OECD. Although they
are not drastically di¤erent among developed countries, they show some hetero-
geneity and change over time. See some examples in table 2.
Finally one must address the elasticity of substitution among varieties. A
large number of previous studies explores how to measure the actual value of
22The original database the authors used in that paper ends in 2004. I based my analysis
on their updated webpage version of the dataset, published online in 2009.
23 I also tried two other options. First, I based an analysis on C. Kamps (2004), who
publishes his dataset on the Kiel Institute for World Economics webpage. This workbook
contains net capital stock estimates for the period 1960 - 2001 for 22 OECD countries. These
estimates are constructed by applying the Perpetual Inventory Method, following the prac-
tice of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. However, I would
have been forced to drop two countries from my already reduced dataset. Second, I dened
 = FA+FL
Total Market capitalization
: However, I omitted it because it does not cover such a large
measure of assets and liabilities as total wealth in H&P does.
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Country 1995 2000 2005
Australia 0:66 0:64 0:61
France 0:69 0:67 0:67
Ireland 0:66 0:57 0:58
Japan 0:63 0:62 0:58
United States 0:67 0:68 0:65
Table 2: Labor income share. Source: OECD.
di¤erent kinds of elasticities of substitution (depending on whether they con-
sider the existence of, for instance, durable and non-durable goods or tradable
and non-tradable goods).24 Broda and Weinstein (2006), in an international
context, nd that elasticities have been declining over time as goods become
more and more di¤erentiated. These authors observe di¤erent elasticities for
di¤erent countries. Bergin (2003) nds that the suitable value of the elastic-
ity of substitution for a NOEM model with a CES consumption basket would
be slightly over 1 for Australia, slightly below 1 for a country like the United
Kingdom and as high as 6 for Canada. Unfortunately, he only carries out the
study for the three mentioned countries. The lack of country-specic data for
my elasticity forces me to choose a common arbitrary value for , which reduces
the accuracy of the model predictions. For my model to o¤er a quantitatively
compelling account of the patterns of international diversication, I should set
 around 2:5. This value is in the range of standard accepted values in open
macro.
5.3 Comparing the Predictions to the Data
In this subsection I use average diversication across countries for the three years
for which I have data (1995, 2000 and 2005) and explore the linear relationship
of its reciprocal with the reciprocal of the average of imports content of capital
goods depicted by equation (37). I estimate by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
and Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) the following equation:
1

= 0 + 1
1
1   + "; (38)
where " is an error term. The theoretical relationship (37) states that 0 =
2(1 ) and 1 = . Thus, to test if equation 37 is true, I will test the null
hypothesis
H0 : 0 = 2 (1  1) : (39)
Table 3 presents the results. Column [1] reports the OLS regression of equa-
tion (38). As one can see, ^0 = 0:18 and does not di¤er signicantly from
24See, for example, Feenstra (1994), Bergin (2003), Broda and Weinstein (2006) and Imbs
and Méjean (2010).
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zero. The estimated slope coe¢ cient ^1 = 0:34 and di¤ers signicantly from
zero at the one-percent signicance level. At the bottom of the table, I present
the F test corresponding to the null hypothesis in (39). The calculated Fisher
statistic is F (1; 22) = 7:87 . The 1% critical value from an F distribution with
(1; 22) degrees of freedom is 7:95 , and therefore the null hypothesis (39) cannot
be rejected. In other words, the theoretical relationship depicted by equation
(37) is supported by the empirical evidence. To be sure that this result is not
driven by specic countries, I have also excluded some specic countries in Col-
umn [1b] and performed a LAD regression (which is more robust to inuential
observation than OLS). In Column [1b], Ireland and Luxembourg are omitted
from the regression. These countries are particularly unusual. Luxembourg is a
small country but a huge nancial center and the weight of foreign assets and
liabilities over wealth is far from the second most diversied country. Ireland
experienced a dramatic jump in its portfolio allocation towards foreign assets
and liabilities between one observation in time and the next, making the mean
of the three year points quite uninformative for this country. Excluding these
two countries, I obtain F (1; 20) = 4:37 . The 1% critical value from an F distri-
bution with (1; 20) degrees of freedom is 8:10 , and again, I cannot reject the
theoretical relationship (37). Column [2] presents the LAD regression. The F
test is 5:03 and much lower than the 1% critical value from the F distribution
with (1; 22) degrees of freedom (7:95 , as already stated). Hence, I do not reject
the relationship using a LAD either.25
Column [3] presents a calibrated version of the relationship. To do so, I have
assumed that  = 2:5 . As previously discussed, this value is a reasonable and
standard value for an elasticity of substitution for a CES basket of consumption.
I obtain values that are very close to the estimates of the econometric speci-
cations of Columns [1]-[1b]-[2].  = 0:35 and 2(1 ) = 1:43 . As one can
easily see, the ^1 of Columns [1]-[1b]-[2] do not di¤er signicantly from 0:35 ;
concerning ^0, it does not di¤er signicantly from 1:43 in Columns [1] and [1b]
(i.e., in column [1], the estimated standard error is 0:518 , and the estimated
coe¢ cient is 0:18 ; knowing that the student t is 2:81 for 22 degrees of freedom,
the 99% condence interval is [ 1:27; 1:63] ).
25H&Ps model nds exactly the same link between the constant and the coe¢ cient tied to
the reciprocal of trade openness, although in their case 0 = 2 (1  ) and 1 =  . Moreover,
due to the structure of their model, they use data on total international trade instead of the
capital goods market. By replicating their empirical analysis with the data provided in Perris
webpage, one can see that their coe¢ cients do not pass this test.
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OLS LAD Model
[1] [1b] [2] [3]
1
1  0:34 0:32 0:36 0:35
(0:067) (0:069) (0:04)
cons 0:18 0:46  0:15 1:43
(0:518) (0:548) (0:448)
24 22 24 24
R2 0:53 0:51
 2:5
F (1;n)
H0:0 2(1 1)
7:87 4:37 5:03
p  value 0:0103 0:0495 0:0353
Table 3: Cross-sectional regressions.
6 Conclusions
I developed a stylised two-period, two-country model with perfect risk sharing.
The dynamic number of rms and the international portfolio diversication are
endogenously determined. The model builds on Heathcote and Perri (2009)s
idea of the compatibility of the home bias in portfolio found in actual data with
perfect risk sharing.
The model presented here conrms that an equilibrium exists where a home-
biased and constant portfolio allocation is able to provide households with per-
fect risk sharing, i.e., the equity puzzle is not such a puzzle. It shows that
the terms of trade play an important role in neutralizing the e¤ects of country-
specic shocks on relative consumption, as Cole and Obstfeld (1991) claimed.
However, they are not able to o¤set the disturbances to investment. One needs
to diversify assets to control for such disturbances.
There are several main contributions of this analysis. First, it highlights the
need to distinguish between the preferences of demand on capital and those on
consumption goods. It is the home-bias parameter in the Cobb-Douglas aggre-
gator for physical capital demand that determines the level of diversication.
H&P does not identify it because they use the same parameter both for con-
sumption and for capital. Second, I investigated the role of the endogenous
number of rms or varieties in the determination of the portfolio allocation. I
nd that these two endogenous variables are completely independent when the
economy has exible determination of prices, i.e., in the long run. Finally, the
ability of the model to explain the patterns of international diversication is
tested. An empirical analysis of a cross-section of 24 OECD countries shows a
clear positive relationship between the home bias in capital goods and the home
bias in aggregate portfolios. The model is able to match the data, although
the result is dependent on the value assigned to the elasticity of substitution
23
between goods. Unfortunately, the true country-values for this elasticity are not
available. Moreover, the model correctly predicts the link between the constant
and the slope present in the actual data in the tested regression.
24
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